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Abstract
We analyse the functioning of the Belgian franc in' the European Monetary System
between 1979 and 1991. A discrete time target zone model which captures the features
displayed by the ,continuous time models is combined with intervention data provided by
the Belgian central bank.' Simple prediction formulas are derived to calculate one-week-
ahead conditional probabilities on a realignment of the Belgian franc relative to the
Deutsche mark. The devaluation probabilities are matched with the intervention data. We
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1. INTRODUCTION
During the formative years of the European Monetary System (EMS), Belgium followed
more or less similar monetary and exchange rate policies as France and had, like France,
to devalue its currency repeatedly. First gradually and since mid 1990 more drastically,
Belgium changed its monetary policy. Currently, Belgium pegs its currency more strongly
to the D-mark than is required by prevailing EMS rules. It seems that the functioning of
the EMS has had a clear effect on Belgian monetary policies and the Belgian franc. In
this paper we analyse the behaviour of the Belgian franc from the beginning of the EMS
until the affirmation of the new policy in 1990.
To analyse the behaviour of the Belgian franc we develop a discrete time target zone
model for a partially credible band, in which official intervention as a tool to keep the
franc within the band, is made explicit. The motivation for this setup is as follows. The
analysis of a target zone has recently gained momentum through the elegant solution for
the exchange rate behavior developed by Krugman (1991), showing that the exchange rate
approaches the band in a S-shaped manner. The analysis, however, is cast in the frame-
work of a continuous time regulated Brownian" motion, and is therefore not particularly
amenable to empirical analysis (see e.g. Flood et aL, 1991). Several factors contribute to
this: (i) interventions do not appear to be infinitesimal at the boundaries, but rather are
discrete and intra-marginal in nature (Dominguez and Kenen, 1992); (ii) exchange-rate
innovations tend to be non-normal fat tailed distributed (see Koedijk et ai., 1990) and
exhibit clusters of volatility (see Baillie and McMahon, 1989, chA), (iii) and estimation
of the continuous time model is rather involved. A discrete time model such as developed
in Koedijk et ale (1993) is better able to capture the distributional propenies and straight-
forward to estimate.
Apart from the discrete time aspect, the other important feature of our analysis is the
explicit modelling of official intervention. In Krugman's target zone model, the exchange
rate is kept" within the band through regulation of the fundamentals. Assuming that
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excessive money supply is the driving force behind the pressure on the currency, official
interVention can then be used to counter the slide of the currency. In this paper we
explicitly take account of this policy tool. The fonunate availability of discrete data on
Belgium official intervention enables us to conduct an empirical evaluation.
From the Belgian central bank we have available an indicator data set showing in which
weeks. the bank undenook official EMS interventions. The effect of interventions is
studied in two ways. We distinguish a level and a volatility effect. It is often maintained
that official intervention should not be directed at changing the current exchange rate,
which given the (near) maningale nature is infeasible, but should be targetted at lowering
the exchange rate volatility. Studies in the past, such as the large scale project by the US
Federal Reserve on sterilized intervention indeed convey that interventions have almost no
level effect. Much less attention has been paid towards the possibility of calming down
markets. The model we develop nicely allows for distinguishing between the two effects.
The plan of this paper is as follows. In section 2 we introduce the discrete time target
zone model and incorporate the central bank intervention into the specification. In section
3 we estimate the model, test for the S-effect and the various intervention effects. We
also try to infer the degree of credibility of the franc in section 4. This is done by
calculating one-step-aheaci realignment probabilities. To further evaluate the functioning
of the Belgian franc, we match realignment probabilities 'with official intervention data in
section 5. Conclusions are offered in section 6.
2. TIIEORY
The reduced form free float model in discrete time has the following canonical structure
(l) O<A<l,
where s denotes the logarithm of the spot exchange rate and f denotes the fundamentals.
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If ft follows a maningale, then the no-bu
bble solution to St is well-known to be linear in
ft:
00
(2) St(/,) = E ).,i E t [f,+i] = It I (1 - A).
i=O
Now suppose St is kept within a band through regulation of ft at symmetric
boundaries -f
and C, Le. ft+ 1=ft+et+ I if ft+e t+ I E [-C, 11, while ft+ I is kept at the b.o
undary which
would otherwise be exceeded. 1 If the distribution of Et is unimodal, su
ch as is the case
for e.g. the normal and student-t distributions, then st(ft) becomes a
convexoconcave
function about the central parity q. To see this, first consider the effe
ct of a one sided
bound on f, say a fundamentals floor -f. Thus ft+ 1 slopes downward along the 45' -line
as ft+et+ 1 is falling, until the floor is reac
hed and ft+ I is kept constant at -1. Hence
ft+ 1 is a convex function in ft+et+ 1. L
et k(.) be any convex function, and let gee) be the
density of e. For any pair f l' f2 E R the following basi
c inequality holds:
Because (3) holds for any E, integration with respect to E preserves the
weak inequality.
Hence E[k(f+e)] is convex in f. Repeated application of this result and
the fact that the
class of convex functions is closed under addition, shows that EAiE,[
ft+ i] is a convex
function of ft in case of a price floor. Simil
ar reasoning can be used to show that s(t) is
.,
concave near an upper boundary-. Several authors, see e.g. Flood e
t ale (1991) and
Pesaran and Samiei (1992), have investigated the S-shaped relation betw
een s and f. The
difficulty in this approach is that we lack a reliable model of the fundam
entals, cf. Meese
and Rogoff (1983). Here we take an indirect route, by noting that St a
nd St+ 1 are also
For the purpose of presentation in this part of the paper the central party q is se
t at q=O.
2 A full fledged proof for the case of two sided regulation through a band usin
g Leibniz'
rule and exploiting unimodality is available in Koedijlc et al. (1993).
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linked through a S-shaped function. Nevenheless, we have information about a subset of
the fundamentals, i.e. the official intervention data, and this is made explicit. Assuming
that official intervention I enters linearly, like in the monetary model, we split the vector
of fundamentals: f=f' +pI. We can then rewrite eq (1) as follows
E [ IIpr s,+il = -Sf - -1, - -1'+1A A A
(4)
=a(Sr) - fIr+ 1
say, where a(s) is convexoconcave in s3. Given rational expectations and the nature of I,
we arrive at
where the innovation «Pt + 1 is onhogonal to the information set.
The nonlinear function a(sr) can be approximated by a Taylor expansion around the
central parity q, after which the coefficients of the expansion are estimated by standard
regression techniques, see Cramer (1969, Ch.5). Interestingly, Rose and Svensson (1991)
and Svensson (1993) use similar specifications, except for the explicit modelling of the
intervention. A first order expansion of a(s) in eq. (5) renders4:
(6) sr+1 = q, + (J(s,-q,) - ~I"'1 + i'r+l
where i't+ 1 comprises the remainder of the expansion plus the onhogonal innovation
3
4
Recalling that s(f) is convexoconcave and using the implicit function theorem, it can be
shown that s-f is convexoconcave in s.
In case of the free tloat and fully credible target zone solution this would also be the
second order expansion, due to the convexoconcavity of a(5) around q.
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4't+l. Equation (6) can be rewritten in a format that is estimated more easily. The
intervention data consist of a 011 variable, with value 1 for the weeks in which the central
bank intervened and 0 Jor the other weeks. To enable an effective comparison between
intervention weeks and non-intervention weeks, we replace the term -p-1'+1 byA
CX11t+ 1 + cx2(l - 1t+ 1)· Moreover, let (3 = I • 0 and rewrite eq. (6) as follows.
If 0 = 0 cannot be rejected we conclude that the exchange rate band has no influence on
the exchange rate. If on the other hand, 0 > 0 significantly, there is mean reversion of
the exchange rate and we conclude that the band is effective. The next step is to specify
the error term '1't+ 1. In the case of a fully credible band the conditional innovation 4't+ l'
given St' follows a two-sided tru!1cated distribution, e.g. Pesaran and Samiei (1992). In
case of the Svensson partially credible band the conditional distribution of ~t+ 1 becomes
a mixture of two distributions, one of which is truncated. In reality the EMS exchange
rates do exit the band and this has to be modelled. Our approach will be to (directly)
make some distributional assumptions for 'i' which do justice to the established empirical
regularities, but at the risk of violating the moment restrictions implied by eq. (5).
There are two prominent empirical regularities: (i) exchange rate innovations are non-
normal, fat-tailed;· and (ii) exhibit clusters of volatility. Both regularities are present in
freely floating dollar rates and the regulated EMS rates, see Baillie and McMahon (1989,
ch. 4) and Koedijk et ale (1990). The GARCH (1,1) process with Student-t innovations is
used to exhibit both regularities. In addition, we want to allow for a volatility effect of
intervention because it is often stated that official intervention should not be used for
trying to influence the exchange rate level, but rather should be directed at tempering the




h 1/2'f t+l = Xt+ 1[ t+l (11-2)/11] ,
· ,-
and where the xt are i.i.d. Student-t with II degrees of freedom distributed variables. Here
wI I measures the tempering effect of intervention on volatility.
3. Empirical Results
3.1 Data Description
Weekly quotations of exchange rates are taken from Datastream, covering the period from
2 April 1979, up to and including 15 July 1991. All quotations are middle rates, the
average of bid and offer rates. Germany is taken as the benchmark country and the
exchange rate is expressed as the number of D-marks per unit of Belgian francs (British
notation). Table 1 repons the key characteristics of the dataset.
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of the Returns: Rt = lOO*ln(St/St_l)
No. obs Minimum Maximum Mean St. Dev. Skewness Kunosis
643 -6.47 3.18 -0.014 0.572 -2.37 29.2
The mean return is negative due to the repeated devaluations of the Belgian franc against
the D-mark, but is small in absolute value. The distribution is skewed to the left and has
a high level of kunosis, which confirms the heavy tailed behavior found in many studies
on daily and weekly exchange rates, e.g. Boothe and Glassman (1987), Koedijk et ale
(1990) and Hols and de Vries (1991).
Belgium was one of the founding members of the EMS as it joined both the EMS and the
ERM as early as March 1979. Since then the Belgian franc devalued seven times. The
7
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realignment dates and magnitudes are given in Table 2:
Table 2. Realignment Dates and Magnitudes
24/09n9 05/10/81 I 22102182 14/06/82 23/03/83 07/04/86 12101187
-2.0 % -5.5 % I ·8.5 % -4.25 % -4.0 % -2.0 % -1.0 %
Both the frequency and the size of the realignments are reduced over time, indicating the
increased convergence of the EMS economies.
3.2 Parameter Estimation
Next, the model of eq. (7)-(9) is estimated by maximum likelihood. Parameter estimates
and 95% (simulated) confidence intervals between brackets are reported in Table 3:
Table 3. Parnmeter Estimates
Cll CI~ a ~1 ~ I "Y r "
-1.23 E·3 -0.18 E·3 0.08S 0.S3 E-6 1.69 E-6 0.24 0.77 4.17
(-UO E·3. (-0.67 E·3. (0.083. (0.14 E·6. (0.S8 E·6, (0.12. (0.6S. (3.01.
-0.98 E·3) 0.30 E·3) 0.087) 1.70 E·6) 4.52 E·6) 0.38) O.8S) 6.00)
A prominent feature of the results reported in Table 3 is the fact that the sum of the
parameters of the GARCH (1,1) process (oy,n exceed I, possibly implying infinite
unconditional variance. Hence the standard t-test confidence interval may not be appli-
cable. Therefore we determined the significance of the parameter estimates by means of
confidence intervals generated through Monte Carlo simulations, see Appendix A. The
confidence intervals show that only the estimate for Q2 is not significantly different from
zero. Several of the confidence intervals are slightly skewed to the right, but the
estimated parameter value is usually in the middle of the intervalS.
5 This is also testified by the figures in Appendix A.
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The significance of the mean-reversion effect is determined by the 0 estimate. The
standard unit root test is again impaired by the IGARCH nature of the model. Hence, we
again turned to simulations in order to test against the presence of a unit root. Restricting
0=0, the model (7)-(9) together with the point estimates from Table 3 were used to
generate the needed replications (see Appendix A for a description of the Monte Carlo
procedure). The 95% (simulated) confidence interval for 0, when 0=0, reads (-0.0055,
0.011), and clearly does not include the original o-estimate value of 0.085. We therefore
conclude that there is strong empirical support for mean-reversion of the Belgian franc-
Deutsch mark exchange rate, as predicted by the target zone model.
The specification of eq. (7) also enables us to determine whether and how the change in
the exchange rate was affected by government intervention. The fact that (Xl is more
negative than parameter (X:! means, that on average in the intervention weeks the exchange
rate decreased more than in weeks without intervention. The significance of the difference
between al and (X2 is determined through Monte Carlo simulations. We replicated the
model as if (Xl =a2=a (=-0.81 E-3). The value of a is determined by reestimating the
model under the above restriction. The 95% contidence intervals of al and a2 then
become (-1.09 E-3, -0.55 E-3) and (-1.29 E-3, -0.36 E-3) and don't include the estimated
values of a 1 and (X2' We therefore conclude that the difference is signiticant. This finding
suggests that a policy of leaning against the wind was used. by the Belgian monetary
authorities6.
The estimates of "', and "'2 in eq. (9) indicate that on average the conditional variance
was relatively low during the intervention, weeks. To determine the significance of the
difference between "'1 and "'2' we again resorted to replicating the model with "'1=~=
0.71 E-6 and reestimated the model. The 95 % confidence intervals of '"1 and ~ are
(0.39; 1.32) and (0.12; 1.95) which shows the difference is not significant at the 5 % level.
Hence, contrary to the results for the exchange rate change (al < (2), we find no
6 For a recent review article on intervention, see Almekinders and Eyffinger (1993).
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significant difference between intervention weeks and non-intervention weeks with regard
to exchange rate variability.
4. Realignments and Rumours
The uses of the model are its potential to foresee upcoming realignments earlier than the
general public, and the role of official intervention in deferring realignments. This section
focusses on forecasting potential. while the next section looks into the other issue.
Suppose that a realignment takes place whenever the fundamental and hence the exchange
rate moves outside the band. From eqs. (7) - (9) the one step ahead probability on this
event can be calculated. In practice we only observe the band on the exchange rate, [b,u]
say, where b and u denote the lower and upper boundaries on the exchange rate. Also,
the interventions are not public information. Hence they can not be used for forecasting
realignments. Therefore, in eq. (7) the term alIt + 012(1 - It+1) is replaced by the
constant a and in eq. (9) the term "', It + "'2 (1 - It) is replaced by the constant "'. 'The
probability of a realignment and t+ 1 given information up to and E including tis: 1 - P{b
< St+ 1 < u}. From the adjusted equations (7) - (9) we find:
(10)
[
b-a-O-O)sr-o q u-a-(l-o)sr-o q]
P {b < sr.l < u} = P 1/2 < xr+1 < \12
[hr. 1(v-2)/v] [hr+ 1(v-2)/v]
and where
After reestimating the model for cxl =cx2=a (= -0.81 E-3, see above) and "'1 =~='"
(=0.71 E-6, see above), the parameter estimates of the GARCH with mean-reversion
model of table 3 are employed to calculate the one-step-ahead realignment probabilities
for the Belgian franc versus the D-mark. These probabilities are recorded in figure 1,
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weeks. The venical axis measures one-step-ahead devaluation and revaluation probabil-
ities in percentage points. The upper half of the figure contains the revaluation probabil-
ities and the lower half contains the devaluation probabilities. The dashed bars with dates
printed alongside in a vertical format indicate the date the Belgian franc devalued against
the D-mark. The other bars denote the one-step-ahead revaluation probabilities (upper half
of figure 1) and devaluation probabilities (lower half of figure 1).
The general impression that emerges from figure I is that realignment probabilities are
most prominent between 1979 and 1987. After the devaluation in January 1987 realign-
ment probabilities decrease substantially. This supports the notion that in recent years the
Belgian franc has gained credibility7. A second aspect which immediately strikes the eye
is that according to figure 1, there were a few shon periods during which there were
moderately high revaluation probabilities of the Belgian franc against the D-mark around
1981/1982 and 1983. These short episodes of relatively high revaluation probability are
caused by the position of the franc in the top of the band immediately after a devaluation.
In line with expectations however, the devaluation probabilities do in general exhibit more
pronounced and more frequent periods of strain versus the D-mark. A more detailed
assessment of figure 1 is achieved by comparing the signals given by the realignment
probabilities to the abstracts of the Financial Times around the realignment dates8.
The first thing to notice is that prior to five of the seven devaluations the one-step-ahead
devaluation probabilities are quite high. Only for the devaluations of 22-03-1982 and 12-
01-1987 did the probabilities lack to provide early warning signs of more than twenty
percent. The periods of increased tension often precede realignments and seem to come in
surging waves during which the probabilities jump up and down. In most cases, as soon
as the currency devalues, the devaluation probabilities decrease immediately. This
indicates that the devaluation sufficed to take away the tension between the Belgian franc
and the D-mark and that the exchange rate returned to a stable situation. The devaluation
7 .
8
See for instance Ungerer et al. (1990).
Complete transcripts are available from the second author upon request.
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of 22-02-1982 apparently is different as it is succeeded by increasing instead of decreas-
ing devaluation probabilities. That this was not an ordinary devaluation is also testified by
the newspapers and broadcasts around that time. This remarkable realignment is discussed
in extenso below.
In our discussion we focus on the four largest devaluations of the Belgian franc relative to
the D-mark. which are the devaluations of respectively 05-10-81, 22·02·82, 14-06-82 and
21-03-83.
The first realignment we focus on is the realignment of 05-,10-81. The end of 1980 and
especially early 1981 were turbulent times for the EMS. In the spring of 1981 devaluation
probabilities suddenly jumped up as can be seen from figure 1. This pressure was also
felt by other EMS currencies and on 23-03-1981 the Italian Lira was devalued with six
percent against the D-mark. The increasing strains in the EMS were reponed by "Het
Financieel Dagblad", Which on March 24 stated (translation is ours): "AI/hough in foreign
exchange markets this action of the Italian governmem had been expected for some time,
the timing was a surprise. Also, a combined action had been expected as the strong D-
mark has made more victims recemly". In spite of the increasing pressure to devalue, the
Belgian Central Bank sticked to its proclaimed no-devaluation rule. Belgian newspapers in
April 1981, i.e. one week after the devaluation of the Italian Lira, did expect the Belgian
franc to devalue in less than a week's time and there was a large public discussion on the
pro's and contra's of a devaluation. At the time the central bank seemed determined not
to be influenced and managed to postpone the devaluation until October 1981 through
interventions and high interest rates. In October the Belgian central bank had to give in
and the Deutsche mark was revalued with 5.5 percent. Abstracts on 03-10-1981 show that
a general realignment of EMS parities was foreseen: "The sources describe a realignmenr
in the EMS, probably involving a higher revaluation of the D-mark. as well as a devalu-
ation of the French franc as already overdue".
13
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The second realignment we focus on is the devaluation of 22-02-829. As can be seen
from figure 1 this devaluation was not convincingly predicted by our one-step-ahead
probabilities. This realignment was reponed in the Financial Times of 22-02-1982 as a
complete surprise: "EMS members unite against Belgium's 12 % realignmeru proposal;
other EMS members were taken aback by the ambitious scale of the Belgian proposal and
by the fact that it had appeared to encourage Denmark to lodge a request for a 7 %
devaluation of the Krone. The Danish move was consideredopponunistic .... and not
justified by any undue strains on the currency within the EMS". Devaluations of the
Belgian franc were strongly opposed by the central bank on the grounds that it would
trigger a new round of wage and price indexing. The German revaluation at the end of
1981 seemed to take away some of the tension and vested the belief with the public that
the central bank's view was dominant. With the government imposed devaluation of
February 1982, the government sought to provide a shock signal to break the inflation
spiral. The government's view proved to be right, no indexation followed. But the
devaluation also signalled 'the end of the no-devaluation rule. This change in monetary
policy triggered a period of prolonged uncenainty in the exchange market; which explains
why the devaluation probabilities remained high until the second realignment of 1982, on
the 14th of June.
The third reali~nment we focus on is the realignment of 21-03-1983. The realignment
probabilities clearly show that the realignment was long forecasted by our model. The
fact that this realignment of 4 percent was anticipated in the market is corroborated by the
Financial Times. This newspaper reportS on 21-03-83: "This was the most widely
aruicipared of all seven EMS realignmerus u •
After 1987 devaluation probabilities seem to fade out with relatively small outbursts every
now and then. This reflects to a large extent the increased credibility of the EMS and the
9 For an extensive description of the economic conditions preceding this realignment, see De
Grauwe (1992), pp. 43.
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Belgian franc in panicular.
5. Intervention Policy and Devaluation Probabilities
In this section we analyse the intervention policy of the Belgian central bank. In particu-
lar, we focus on the relationship between official intervention and realignment probabil-
ities.
Belgian official intervention and its relation to the Belgian franc is illustrated in Figures 2
and 3. Figure 2 shows a histogram of the position of the Belgian franc. The 4.5%
fluctuation band is divided in 10 equally sized subbands. The horizontal axis measures the
position in the band, that is the subband number. Number 1 represents the subband
covering the area from ,.2.25% up to ·1.80% and number 10 is the subband between
1.80% and 2.25 %. The venical axis measures the ~umber of exchange rate realizations
within each subband. By far the largest number of observations fall in the first five
subbands, that is the lower half of the fluctuation band. Especially the second subband.
which ranges from -1.80% to -1.35% contains many observations.
In order to test the hypothesis that the central bank uses interventions as a tool to lean
against the wind we computed the relative intervention frequency for each of the ten
subbands. For each subband the percentage of weeks during which there were interven-
tions is recorded and plotted in the histogram of Figure 3. The horizontal axis measures
the position in the band, like in Figure 2. The venical axis measures in percentage points
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Figure 3 shows that the relative intervention frequency is high when the Belgian franc is
close to its lower fluctuation margin and that the relative intervention frequency decreases
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when the franc moves up_, away from the lower margin. If the franc moves up funher and
closer to the upper fluctuation margin, then the relative intervention frequency increases
again, as is testified by the tall bar for subband nine. In shon, it seems that the central
bank intensified its intervention activities as the Belgian franc got closer to its fluctuation
margins. At the lower end this is to counter devaluation pressure, at the upper end this is
to increase the reserves lost during an attack (and sometimes in order to suppon a weak
currency).
In the previous section we considered the effects of intervention on the level and the
volatility of the exchange rate through the values of the intercept parameters dj and "'i'
treating It as exogenous. Here we investigate the mutual dependency between It and the
strength of the Belgian franc. Specifically we investigate the correlation between It and
Pt, i.e. the interventions and the devaluation probabilities, through the following
regression.
where It is the intervention in week t (0 or 1), C is a constant and Pt is the probability
that next week the Belgian franc devalues against the D-mark given in eq. (10). We
follow Ungerer (1990) and split the testing period in three separate subperiods:
02/04/1979 - 21103/1983 (1); 28/03/1983 - 07/09/1987 (II); 16/09/1987 - 2210711991
(III). The parameter estimates for the three subperiods are reponed in table 4:
17
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Table 4 Relation between interventions and devaluation probabilities
I II In
c 0.39 0.44 0.37
(3.17) (4.11) (3.68)
13 0.031 0.0035 0.091
(3.69) (0.52) (1.90)
The three columns represent the three subperiods 10. The first row contains the esti-
mates for the constant C and the second contains the estimates for the parameter 13. The t-
values of the parameter estimates are given between brackets. A positive value of 13
implies that a higher value of the devaluation probability corresponds with a higher
probability that the central bank intervened that week. The results show that the relation
between the devaluation pro,bability and relative intervention frequency was significant
only in the first period. For the second period the estimate for 13 is insignificant and there
is no apparent relation between interventions and devaluation probabilities. In the third
'period the evidence for the existence of such a relation reappears, although the estimate
for 13 is significant at the 10% level only.
The results in table 4 are in line with the general evolution of intervention policies within
the EMS as described by Ungerer (1990) and by Mastropasqua et. al. (1988). In the first
period of the EMS, most of the interventions were obligatory and near the margins, as
envisaged by the EMS Agreement. This is contirmed by the highly significant estimate
for 13. In the years to follow, intra-marginal interventions replaced obligatory marginal
interventions. During a relatively shon time (1983-1986), intra-marginal interventions
10 We also ran regressions in which the revaluation probabilities were included. In these
regressions the intercept is significantly positive over all three subperiods. as above. The
coefficient of devaluation probabilities is only signiticant in the tirst subperiod (and has the same




became the rule rather than the exception. It appears that the Basle-Nyb
org agreement of
September 1987 strongly affected the set-up and functioning of the E
MS. One of the
intentions of the agreement was to make a fuller and more flexible use
of the exchange
rate bands in order to deter speculation and avoid intra-marginal interven
tion over longer
periods. Indeed, immediately after September 1987 the franc moved clo
ser to its lower
fluctuation margin and remained there without interruptions until June 1
990. The second
goal of the Bas1e-Nyborg agreement was to avoid too much intra-margin
al interventions,
and this seems to have been accomplished at least panially. The 13 estimate se
ems to
confirm that after September 1987 the relative intervention frequency agai
n was correlated
with the devaluation probability. This implies that there were relativei y m
ore interventions
near the margins than intra-marginally.
6. Conclusion
The aim of this paper was to investigate the behaviour of the Belgium
franc within the
EMS. To evaluate the effects of the presence of a band and the accom
panying official
interventions, we developed a discrete time target zone model. This
model was then
estimated and evaluated in terms of its power to predict upcoming re
alignments. The
effect of the band was uncovered through the significance of the mean r
eversion parame-
ter. Official intervention and exchange rate innovations are negatively co
rrelated, and this
seems to point to a leaning against the wind policy. But we found littl
e evidence for a
policy directed towards reducing volatility through official interventions.
When compared
with statements from the financial press the model seems to anticipate up
coming upheaval
in the currency market early on, except at the time of the drastic cha
nge in monetary
policy in 1982. Official intervention has been used in response to deva
luation pressures
primarily in the first stage of the EMS. The improved conduct of mon
etary policy, i.e.
keeping in line with the German monetary policy. both relieved the
franc from its
frequent devaluation pressure and lessened the necessity of official interv
ention, resulting
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This appendix briefly describes the simulation procedure that was implemented to obtain
the confidence intervals. The point estimates of Table 3 together with eqs. (7)-(9) were
used to generate 1000 replications, each consisting of 643 observations. Each replication
was used to restimate the model, and the parameter estimates were saved. After arranging
the parameter estimates from low to high, the 25th and 97Sth highest estimates were used
as the boundaries of the 95 % confidence intervals. For reference, we here report the
confidence intervals that are obtained under the usual assumption of normality - i.e. the
parameter estimate ± 1.96* s.e. - and note that these do not appreciable differ from the
simulated intervals reported in the main text.
Table lAo Confidence intervals under assumption of normality
a, a .. 6 WI W.. ., r ,
·1.23 E·3 -0.18 E·3 0.085 0.53 E-6 1.69 E·6 0.24 0.77 4.27
(-1.67 E·3. (-0.68 E·3. (O.OSS. (-0.14 E-6. (0.05 E-6. (0.09. (0.65. (2.81.
-0.79 E·3) 0.32 E-3) 0.116) 1.19 E·6) 3.33 E-6) 0.40) 0.90) 5.73)
Also reported in this appendix are the empirical distributions of the parameter estimates
for the simulated data, see the tigures on the following page. It is evident that most


















APPENDIX, NOT FOR PUBLICAnON
In this appendix from Koedijk et al. (1993) the main lemma needed to derive the S-
shaped behaviour of s if f is kept within a band is obtained.
It is shown that E[k(f+e) Ifl is convexoconcave about 0, if k (.) is convexoconcave about
oand e has a unimodal distribution G(e):
E[kif+e) If]=e(j) =
-1-J 1-1 CD
Jk( -J)g(e) de + r k(f+e)g(e)de + rk(j')g(e)de
-011 -}-I I-I
By Leibniz' rule we find
1-1
de(f) = J dk if+e) ()d' 0
df df ge e>,
- -/
and .using the unimodality we also get that
2 1-1 2
d elf) - dIc(f) (If) J d kif+e) ()d--::--- - g - + gee
dr df --I df
• dice -1) g( -J-fJ <0 as f >0
df
Together the signs of these derivatives imply the desired convexoconcavity.
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